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The Re-Emergence of the Legitimate Representative of a 
People: Libya, Syria, and Beyond 
 
Matthias Edtmayer* 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the context of the civil wars in Libya and Syria, a legal term which was well-known during 
the decolonisation process re-emerged in statements issued by different foreign ministries. Libyan 
and Syrian opposition groups were recognised by States as ‘the legitimate representative’ of their 
people. Since, little scholarly attention has been paid to this development. The recognition was 
perceived as political rhetoric rather than an act of legal significance. Even the re-emergence of the 
concept of ‘the legitimate representative of a people’ in a United Nations General Assembly 
(‘UNGA’) resolution passed unnoticed, with its analysis still missing in the existing literature. 
This article argues that the re-emergence of the concept of ‘the legitimate representative of a people’ 
in cases outside the decolonisation process might hint at the beginning of a legal development, 
which allows the assistance and supply of arms to opposition groups recognised as the legitimate 
representative of a people. It provides an analysis of the statements made by States in regard to 
UNGA Resolution 67/262 and contends that the legal concept of ‘the legitimate representative 
of a people’ could evolve in those future cases in which democratically elected groups have been 
barred from access to power or ousted by coups d’état. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This article discusses the re-emergence of the concept of the legitimate 
representative of a people. It is divided into three sections. The first outlines the 
development of the recognition of Libyan and Syrian opposition groups as the 
respective legitimate representative of their people. It reviews the origins of the 
concept and the recognition of national liberation movements as the 
corresponding legitimate representative of their people. Next, the consequences 
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of being recognised as the legitimate representative of a people will be examined. 
This second section analyses the implications of the concept in the cases of Libya 
and Syria for the recognition of governments, intervention, and the use of force. 
In doing so, the section scrutinises State practice and opinio iuris. It incorporates 
an analysis of United Nations General Assembly (‘UNGA’) Resolution 67/262.1 
The final section looks beyond Libya and Syria to suggest how this re-emerging 
concept might be shaped in future cases. The section contends that the concept 
could de lege ferenda thrive in cases in which democratically elected groups have 
been barred from access to power or ousted by coups d’état. 
 
I. THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE LEGITIMATE 
REPRESENTATIVE OF A PEOPLE AND ITS ORIGINS 
 
The Libyan National Transitional Council (‘NTC’), which opposed the Gaddafi 
government, was established on 27 February 2011. On 10 March 2011, France 
was the first State to recognise the NTC as ‘the legitimate representative of the 
Libyan people’.2 In contrast to France, the position of the UK was initially more 
hesitant, though it evolved quickly thereafter. Initially, the UK referred to the 
NTC as an ‘important and legitimate political interlocutor’.3 By May 2011, 
however, the UK referred to it as ‘a legitimate representative of the Libyan people’ 
and, at the end of June of that same year, it viewed the NTC as ‘the legitimate 
representative of the Libyan people’.4 The development of the terms in which the 
                                               
1 UNGA Res 67/262 (15 May 2013) UN Doc A/RES/67/262 (voted 107-12-59). 
2 Giuseppe Nesi, ‘Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council: When, How 
and Why’ (2011) 21 Italian Y B Int’l L 45, 45-53; Stefan Talmon, ‘Recognition of the 
Libyan National Transitional Council’ (2011) 15 ASIL Insights 2; ‘Libye: Paris Juge 
L’opposition Légitime’ Le Figaro (Paris, 10 March 2011) <www.lefigaro.fr/flash-
actu/2011/03/10/97001-20110310FILWWW00448-libye-le-cnt-legitime-paris.php> 
accessed 20 July 2017. 
3 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Foreign Secretary Meets Libyan Interim 
Transitional National Council Special Envoy’ (29 March 2011) 
<www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-meets-libyan-interim-transitional-
national-council-special-envoy> accessed 20 July 2017. 
4 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Head of the Libyan National Transitional Council 
Visits UK’ (12 May 2011) <www.gov.uk/government/news/head-of-the-libyan-
national-transitional-council-visits-uk> accessed 20 July 2017; Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, ‘UK Provides Equipment to the National Transitional Council 
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UK referred to the NTC expresses different levels of support. The same pattern 
can be observed in the case of Syria. 
In November 2012, the Syrian National Council merged with other 
opposition groups to form the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Forces (‘SOC’).5 Talmon points out the different wording of the 
statements made by States in support of the SOC. States ‘recognised’, ‘accepted’, 
‘acknowledged’ or ‘considered’ the SOC as 
 
(i) a legitimate representative for [of] the aspirations of the Syrian 
people; 
(ii) legitimate representatives of the aspirations of the Syrian people; 
(iii) a legitimate representative of the Syrian people; 
(iv) legitimate representatives of the Syrian people; 
(v)  the legitimate representative of the Syrian people; 
(vi) the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people.6 
 
The small differences in the wording matter and Talmon accordingly identifies 
three levels of support. Recognition as a legitimate representative for the 
aspirations of a people is the weakest form of support, indicating that the group 
does not directly represent the people themselves. Recognition as a representative 
or as representatives of a people means that the group is not perceived as the only 
representative by the recognising State and that there might be others that enjoy 
equal recognition. Recognition as the representative of a people is the strongest 
form of support, indicating that the group is the only representative of the 
respective people.7 
The Arab States of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Turkey, and Western 
States, including France, the UK, and the US, were the ones to recognise the SOC 
as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people. However, not even all EU 
                                               
in Libya’ (30 June 2011) <www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-provides-equipment-to-
the-national-transitional-council-in-libya> accessed 20 July 2017. 
5 Stefan Talmon, ‘Recognition of Opposition Groups as the Legitimate Representative of 
a People’ (2013) 12 CJIL 219, 219-221.  
6 ibid 226-228.  
7 ibid, ‘Opposition Groups’ (n 5) 227-230.  
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Member States could agree on this strong form of support. The EU itself 
recognised the SOC as legitimate representatives of the Syrian people.8 
While the nuances in the wording of statements in support of the SOC express 
the level of political support, these nuances might also matter legally. ‘The 
legitimate representative of a people’ is neither a new term in international politics 
nor in public international law. The term originates from the international law of 
self-determination and was used to refer to national liberation movements 
(‘NLMs’) in cases of colonial domination, alien occupation, and racist regimes. In 
the decolonisation context, the phrase, while clearly being used on the political 
stage, also carries legal consequences.9 
Roth shows that providing assistance and arms to NLMs during the 
decolonisation period was international custom. The NLMs were not recognised 
as governments during their time of struggle for independence. Instead, the 
UNGA referred to them and recognised them respectively as the legitimate 
representative of their people. For example, in the case of Namibia, the UNGA 
called upon Member States to ‘render increased and sustained support and 
material, financial, military and other assistance to the South West Africa People’s 
Organization’, which it had previously recognised as ‘the sole and authentic 
representative of the Namibian people’.10 Roth concludes that the State practice 
and the ‘utter lack’ of opinio iuris opposing such assistance means that arming the 
NLMs is not a breach of Article 2(4) of the United Nations (‘UN’) Charter.11 
The concept of the legitimate representative of a people has so far been 
confined to cases related to the decolonisation process. The re-emergence of the 
term in the conflicts of Libya and Syria leads to wider questions about the 
potential legal consequences of recognising a group as the legitimate 
representative of a people outside the decolonisation context. The wording of 
                                               
8 ibid 219-230, 253 (for a list of States that recognised the SOC). 
9 Dapo Akande, ‘Self Determination and the Syrian Conflict – Recognition of Syrian 
Opposition as Sole Legitimate Representative of the Syrian People: What Does this 
Mean and What Implications Does it Have?’ EJIL: Talk! (6 December 2012) 
<www.ejiltalk.org/self-determination-and-the-syrian-conflict-recognition-of-syrian-
opposition-as-sole-legitimate-representative-of-the-syrian-people-what-does-this-mean-
and-what-implications-does-it-have> accessed 20 July 2017. 
10 UNGA Res 35/227A (3 March 1981) UN Doc A/RES/35/227A (voted 114-0-22) 42. 
11 Brad R Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (OUP 1999) ch 6, 201-242. 
Talmon is more cautious whether such a rule of customary international law 
developed, see Talmon, Opposition Groups’ (n 5) 237. 
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recognition statements is thus crucial. Only recognition as the legitimate 
representative of a people could potentially entail legal consequences. 
 
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF BEING RECOGNISED AS THE 
LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF A PEOPLE: POLITICS 
WITHOUT LEGAL IMPLICATIONS? 
 
The Recognition of Governments 
The recognition of the NTC and the SOC as the legitimate representative 
respectively of the Libyan and Syrian people indicates the loss of legitimacy of the 
government in power. It, then, leads one to the question of whether these groups 
can politically and/or legally represent their people. 
States are legally represented by their government. Logically, one State can 
only have one government. Problems arise when different groups claim to be the 
government. The recognition of governments is sometimes linked to the 
recognition of States, eg, in the case of a potential secession. The question of the 
recognition of the seceding group as being the government is naturally tied to 
whether there even exists a new State, which the group claims to represent, under 
international law.12 This is, however, not the focus of this paper as secession has 
not been an aim of either the NTC or the SOC. The analysis that follows focuses 
on instances in which competing groups claim to represent the State as a whole. 
The test for the recognition of governments in public international law is 
traditionally linked to the notion of effective control over the whole or most of 
the territory of the State. How this control is established is an internal matter of 
the State. International law generally does not protect the lawful transfer of power 
under domestic law. Lauterpacht, in that regard, points out that international law 
is indifferent to the domestic illegality of changes of government. Revolutions, 
coups d’état, or other unconstitutional changes of government are traditionally not 
a subject of international law.13 A competing test for the recognition of 
                                               
12 There is a certain interdependency as one of the generally accepted criteria for statehood 
is an independent and effective government. See Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in 
International Law (CUP 1948) 26-48; James Crawford, The Creation of States in International 
Law (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 37-89, 374-419; Brad R Roth, ‘Secessions, Coups and the 
International Rule of Law: Assessing the Decline of the Effective Control Doctrine’ 
(2010) 11 Melb J Int’l L 393, 393-421. 
13 Lauterpacht (n 12) 87-174; Roth, ‘Secessions’ (n 12) 422-427. 
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governments is the test of legitimacy. While the source of legitimacy was originally 
held to be a dynastic claim to govern, its source is now the legality of the transfer 
of power under domestic constitutional law and democratic governance. In the 
recent past, there have only been a small number of cases in support of the 
legitimacy test.14 In other words, for the majority, the test for the recognition of 
governments remains effective control.15 
In the case of a conflict in which two groups claim to be the government 
of the State as a whole, both the established government and the opposition group 
might exercise effective control over parts of the territory of the State. In this 
case, there is a presumption under international law in favour of the established 
government.16 That so, the established government continues to legally represent 
the whole State even though it has lost effective control over some parts of the 
territory. Such a presumption in favour of the established government will 
continue as long as it resists the opposition group and the resistance is not 
‘ostensibly hopeless or purely nominal’.17 Recognition of an opposition group as 
the government by a foreign State before this point is reached, equates to an 
unlawful intervention and, as such, is a violation of international law. According 
to the test of effective control, the opposition group becomes the government 
and can be lawfully recognised as such by other States when it effectively controls 
the entire (or most of the) State territory with a ‘reasonable prospect of 
permanency’.18 
In relation to the use of force, the aforementioned presumption in favour 
of the established government has important consequences under international 
law. According to the doctrine of intervention by invitation, the government of a 
State can lawfully ask a foreign State to intervene on its territory to assist in the 
fight against opposition groups. This, as one can imagine, can decide the outcome 
                                               
14 For a discussion of the cases of Haiti, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and The Gambia, see 
text at n 107 and 108. 
15 Lauterpacht (n 12) 102-109; Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy (n 11) 142-149; Roth, 
‘Secessions’ (n 12) 427-440. 
16 Lauterpacht refers to the Spanish government during the Spanish Civil War which 
continued to legally represent Spain, inter alia in front of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, despite a significant loss of territory. For further references, see 
Lauterpacht (n 12) 93-94. 
17 ibid 94. 
18 ibid 87-174. 
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of a conflict.19 The presumption in favour of the established government is crucial 
because, without it, States could recognise opposition groups that exercise 
effective control over a part of the State territory as the new government and, in 
doing so, de-recognise the established government. In this scenario, the de-
recognised government would lose its status and the opposition group, as the new 
government of the State, could invite foreign States to help it fight the political 
group of the de-recognised administration.20 
Many States, including the US and the UK, do not accord formal 
recognition to governments anymore, but recognise States only.21 However, 
                                               
19 A controversy remains whether the government loses this privilege when a conflict has 
developed into a civil war. According to the Institut de Droit International resolution 
‘The Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars’ (1975), assistance to either the 
government or the opposition would then be prohibited. On this controversial principle 
of negative equality, see Gregory H Fox, ‘Intervention by Invitation’ in Marc Weller (ed), 
The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (OUP 2015) ch 37. However, 
State practice and opinio iuris of States in the case of Syria do not indicate support for the 
principle of negative equality. Russia has been intervening in Syria upon an invitation 
issued by the Assad government since 2013 when it started arming the Assad forces. 
Since 2015, it directly intervened with its own forces on Syrian territory. Russia claimed 
and emphasised that it believes to be in compliance with international law. Other States 
have not challenged this claim. For example, a joint declaration by the US, the UK, 
France, Germany, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey concerning the Russian intervention 
was mute on the lawfulness of Russia’s actions. In fact, some of these States also rely on 
the doctrine of intervention by invitation to legally justify the intervention in the civil 
war in Yemen. See Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Press conference: the Prime Minister and 
President Vladimir Putin’ (16 June 2013) <www.gov.uk/government/speeches/press-
conference-the-prime-minister-and-president-vladimir-putin> accessed 20 July 2017; 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Joint Declaration on Recent Military Actions of 
the Russian Federation in Syria’ (2 October 2015) 
<www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-declaration-on-recent-military-actions-of-the-
russian-federation-in-syria> accessed 20 July 2017; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
‘A Political Solution in Yemen Remains the Best Way to Counter the Growing Threat 
from Terrorist Groups’ (14 April 2015) <www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-
political-solution-in-yemen-remains-the-best-way-to-counter-the-growing-threat-from-
terrorist-groups> accessed 20 July 2017. 
20 Lauterpacht (n 12) 93-95. 
21 Mexico already stated this policy (the ‘Estrada doctrine’) in 1930. The US ended its 
practice of according recognition to governments in 1977 and the UK did so in 1980. 
See Hilary Charlesworth, ‘The New Australian Recognition Policy in Comparative 
Perspective’ (1991) 18 MULR 1, 8-13; Nesi (n 2) 56. On the meaning of de facto and de 
jure recognition, see Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With 
Particular Reference to Governments in Exile (OUP 1998). 
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exceptions remain, as will be observed in the case of Libya. The Gaddafi 
administration quickly lost its status as government soon after States had 
recognised the NTC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. On 27 
July 2011, the UK recognised the NTC as ‘the sole governmental authority in 
Libya’.22 Warbrick correctly notes that at the time when the UK recognised the 
NTC as the government of Libya, Gaddafi’s army had not yet been defeated and 
still controlled the capital, Tripoli. While the ‘momentum (…) shifted against’23 
Gaddafi at this time, it is still questionable whether its recognition as the 
government was lawful under the effective control test.24 
By the end of August 2011, the NTC conquered Tripoli. On 16 September 
2011, the UNGA adopted a resolution25 approving the unanimous report of the 
Credentials Committee which accepted the credentials of the representatives sent 
by the NTC to the UN. While this is not an explicit recognition of the NTC as 
the government, it is nonetheless an important acknowledgement by a majority 
of UN Member States that the NTC legally represents Libya. The United Nations 
Security Council (‘UNSC’), for the first time, also took note of the NTC in a 
resolution on 16 September 2011.26 The NTC declared the liberation of Libya 
after conquering Sirte in October 2011. After it appointed a new cabinet on 22 
November 2011, the UNSC welcomed ‘the establishment of the transitional 
Government of Libya’ on 2 December 2011.27 
In the case of Syria, the Assad administration is still recognised as the 
government of Syria and benefits from the presumption under international law 
                                               
22 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Libyan Charge d’Affaires to be Expelled from UK’ 
(27 July 2011) <www.gov.uk/government/news/libyan-charge-d-affaires-to-be-
expelled-from-uk> accessed 20 July 2017. 
23 ibid. 
24 Colin Warbrick, ‘British Policy and the National Transitional Council of Libya’ (2012) 
61 ICLQ 247, 252-256. 
25 UNGA Res 66/1 (16 September 2011) UN Doc A/RES/66/1 (voted 114-17-15). 
Notably, all five permanent members of the Security Council voted in favour of the 
resolution in the UNGA but none of them contributed to the official debate, see UNGA 
Verbatim Record (16 September 2011) UN Doc A/66/PV.2.  
26 UNSC Res 2009 (16 September 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2009. 
27 UNSC Res 2022 (2 December 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2022; Warbrick (n 24) 253-264; 
Nesi (n 2) 48-56; ‘Libya’s NTC Announces New Cabinet’ Al Jazeera (Doha, 22 
November 2011) 
<www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/11/20111122182321109582.html> accessed 
20 July 2017. 
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in favour of the established government. At the time when States started 
recognising the NTC and the SOC as the legitimate representative of their people, 
the same States still viewed the Gaddafi and the Assad administrations as 
governments. Talmon correctly notes that recognising a group as the legitimate 
representative of a people does, however, not change the legal status of the 
respective government.28 Recognition as the government and recognition as the 
legitimate representative of a people are separate issues and a group can be 
recognised as the latter without impeding the status of the former. This parallel 
co-existence of two entities confused the media, however.29 
Such co-existence is in line with the cases related to the decolonisation 
process. Notably, NLMs were not recognised as governments during their 
struggle against the colonising government and intervention upon an invitation 
issued not by a government, but by the legitimate representative of a people, was 
not accepted as a legitimate legal basis for any such intervention. An invasion by 
a foreign military in support of an NLM, in other words, would have violated 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.30 The same applies to the cases of Libya and Syria. 
The government of a State should normally also be the legitimate 
representative of its people. The splitting of these roles and their parallel co-
existence indicates that even when a government is perceived as illegitimate, States 
still adhere to the test of effective control and to the presumption in favour of the 
established government in the case of civil war.31 Yet the recognition of the NTC 
as the Libyan government by the UK, which was premature under the test of 
effective control, falls into a wider pattern of the increasing role of legitimacy. 
Legitimacy might have tipped the scales but it was nonetheless the expected 
territorial gains of the NTC that made recognition arguable for the UK 
government. 
                                               
28 Talmon, ‘Opposition Groups’ (n 5) 229-250. 
29 The BBC confused the recognition as the legitimate representative of a people with the 
recognition as the government and reported that France had recognised the NTC as the 
government on 10 March 2011. In fact, France did not recognise the NTC as the 
government until June 2011. See Anne Schuit, ‘Recognition of Governments in 
International Law and the Recent Conflict in Libya’ (2012) 14 Int C L Rev 381, 381-396; 
‘Libya: France Recognises Rebels as Government’ BBC News (London, 10 March 2011) 
<www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12699183> accessed 20 July 2017. 
30 Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy (n 11) 215-217. 
31 Talmon, ‘Opposition Groups’ (n 5) 229-250. 
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Akande notes that the legitimate representative of a people is regarded by 
recognising States as a ‘government in waiting’.32 There seems to be a strong 
presumption among States that the legitimate representative of a people will be 
recognised as the government once it exerts ample effective control. French 
President Hollande presumed that the legitimate representative of a people would 
be recognised as the government at a later point in time. He stated that ‘France 
recognizes the National Syrian Coalition as the sole representative of the Syrian 
people and therefore as the future provisional government of a democratic Syria’.33 
Egypt indicated with respect to the NTC and the resolution approving the report 
of the Credentials Committee: 
 
(…) Now comes the moment of truth, when the will of the 
Libyan people has to be respected. That is why the 
Credentials Committee unanimously approved the request 
of the National Transitional Council to represent Libya at 
the United Nations. Arguing against that would only 
prolong the suffering of the Libyan people and delay 
achieving justice, particularly since close to 90 States 
Members of the United Nations have recognized the 
Libyan National Transitional Council as the only 
representative of the Libyan people — a number that is 
rising every day.34 
 
However, this presumption is merely of a political nature. Recognition as 
the legitimate representative of a people increases the legitimacy of a group and 
expresses support for its future role as the government. It does not, however, 
entail a legal right to be recognised as the future government.35 Effective territorial 
control is still the crucial test that a group needs to pass. Until then, the legitimate 
representative of a people might claim to politically speak for its people but does 
not legally represent them. 
 
                                               
32 Akande (n 9). 
33 Talmon, ‘Opposition Groups’ (n 5) 221-229 (emphasis added). 
34 UN Doc A/66/PV.2 (n 25) 11-12.  
35 Talmon, ‘Opposition Groups’ (n 5) 229-250. 
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Intervention and the Use of Force 
Recognising a group as the legitimate representative of a people does not mean 
recognition as the government of the State. Thus, the legitimate representative of 
a people cannot lawfully invite foreign States to directly intervene with their forces. 
The most important legal consequence of the recognition of the NLMs as the 
legitimate representative of a people within the decolonisation context was the 
lawful supply of assistance and arms by foreign States to such groups. In this 
regard, the development of customary international law has had a profound 
impact on how the principle of non-intervention and the prohibition on the use 
of force, enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, were applied.36 
Without the special status as the legitimate representative of a people, 
funding or supplying arms to opposition groups is unlawful under international 
law. In Nicaragua,37 the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) held that funding 
opposition groups is a violation of the principle of non-intervention.38 However, 
it does not constitute an unlawful use of force.39 Nonetheless, arming and training 
opposition groups is not only an unlawful intervention, but also a violation of the 
prohibition of the use of force.40 
Two questions need to be answered to clarify whether the rule of 
customary international law, which makes the supply of arms to the legitimate 
representative of a people lawful, also applies to the cases of Libya and Syria. First, 
does the international law of self-determination apply to the people in Libya and 
Syria? Second, if so, does this rule of customary international law apply to all 
groups recognised as the legitimate representative of a people or only to NLMs 
in cases related to the decolonisation process?41 
Common Article 1(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 1966 (‘Common Article 1’) reads that ‘All peoples have the right of self-
                                               
36 Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy (n 11) 201-242. 
37 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United 
States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 1986, 14. 
38 ibid [228], [239]-[243]. 
39 ibid [228]. 
40 Akande (n 9); Dapo Akande, ‘Would It Be Lawful For European (or Other) States to 
Provide Arms to the Syrian Opposition?’ EJIL: Talk! (17 January 2013) 
<www.ejiltalk.org/would-it-be-lawful-for-european-or-other-states-to-provide-arms-
to-the-syrian-opposition> accessed 20 July 2017. 
41 ibid; Akande, ‘Self Determination and the Syrian Conflict’ (n 9). 
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determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’.42 Cassese 
asserts that the right of self-determination, enshrined in Common Article 1, is a 
legal right of all peoples and not just of colonial peoples.43 That said, the content 
of the right of self-determination is unclear outside cases related to the 
decolonisation process – one might even say it is lex obscura – but it nonetheless 
remains a right of all peoples.44 
Talmon posits that only the recognition of an opposition group that 
represents a people under colonial or alien subjugation as the legitimate 
representative entails legal consequences. In contrast, the recognition of an 
opposition group representing ‘a single people constituting a sovereign and 
independent State’ as the legitimate representative would not carry any legal 
consequences. The former would have a legal status in public international law 
and the latter would not.45 Talmon claims the following: 
 
A single people which has exercised its right of external 
self-determination by establishing a sovereign and 
independent State no longer has any rights or obligations 
under international law independent of the rights and 
obligations of its State. In other words, the people has been 
“mediatized” by the State, i.e. the people as a legal person 
has been subsumed into the State. In particular, a single 
people constituting a State, as distinct from individuals, 
minority groups, indigenous peoples, or several peoples 
within a State, does not have any rights under international 
law against its own State or government (…) In particular, 
a single people within a State does not enjoy a right of 
internal self-determination against its own State or 
                                               
42 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 
3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (emphasis added). 
43 Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (CUP 1995) 47-61. 
44 James Crawford, ‘The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its 
Development and Future’ in Philip Alston (ed), Peoples’ Rights (OUP 2001) 7-67, 10. 
45 Talmon, ‘Opposition Groups’ (n 5) 234-237. 
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government. While the right of internal self-determination, 
i.e. the right of a people freely to determine its political 
status and to pursue its economic, social and cultural 
development, also applies to peoples of independent and 
sovereign States, it is available only to peoples in 
independent multinational States, i.e. States composed of 
more than one people.46 
 
Talmon bases his conclusion on two presumptions. First, he claims that 
the right of self-determination is exhausted through the exercise of external self-
determination. However, many scholars disagree with this interpretation. Cassese 
emphasises that the right of self-determination, enshrined in Common Article 1, 
is a continuing right.47 Akande also notes, in regard to Common Article 1, that it 
‘is well recognised that all the peoples of independent States continue to have the 
right of self-determination’.48 Second, Talmon claims that only peoples in 
multinational States have the right of internal self-determination. On this point, 
Cassese highlights that the Covenants ‘enshrined the right of the whole 
population of each contracting State to internal self-determination, that is, the right 
freely to choose their rulers’.49 Franck goes further to even suggest that the 
international law of self-determination contributed to an emerging right to 
democratic governance.50 
Although the concept of the legitimate representative of a people clearly 
originates from the international law of self-determination, States have not 
explicitly expressed, in the case of Syria, that the recognition of the SOC as the 
legitimate representative of the Syrian people means that they view the Syrian 
revolution as a struggle for self-determination to which the law of self-
determination applies.51 However, in the case of Libya, Nicaragua notably stated 
                                               
46 ibid 235-236. 
47 Cassese (n 43) 54-55. 
48 Akande, ‘Self Determination and the Syrian Conflict’ (n 9). 
49 Cassese (n 43) 65 (emphasis added). 
50 Thomas M Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86 AJIL 
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51 Akande, ‘Arms to Syrian Opposition’ (n 40); Akande, ‘Self Determination and the Syrian 
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with respect to the Libyan NTC and the resolution approving the report of the 
Credentials Committee that: 
 
Nicaragua has been and remains a fervent defender of the 
self-determination of the peoples of the world. (…) 
Nicaragua will always respect the will of the peoples – the 
only teachers of their future, the only sovereigns of the 
political, social and economic model that they wish to 
choose for themselves, free from any hegemonic caprice of 
any Power. (…) Free determination must be of the peoples, 
and not of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
Revolutions cannot but be authentic. They cannot be 
carried out by proxy (…).52 
 
While Nicaragua expressed opposition to the intervention by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (‘NATO’) States, it still seems to be of the opinion 
that the revolution in Libya, despite not being a case related to the decolonisation 
process or external self-determination, is (or at least could have been if it were not 
for intervention by NATO) a case of self-determination. 
In the literature, there is allusion to the irony that some Western States 
now recognise opposition groups as the legitimate representative of a people and 
are the main supporters of the re-emergence of the term, while they abstained 
from recognising NLMs as such.53 However, the greater irony might be found in 
the case of Syria. Already in 1952, the Syrian Representative at the UNGA 
emphasised that the principle of self-determination has ‘two aspects’: while one 
aspect is independence, the other is ‘self-government, that is to say a people’s right 
to adopt representative institutions and freely to choose the form of government 
which it wished to adopt’.54 On the first question as to whether the international 
law of self-determination applies to the people in Libya and Syria, it should be 
noted that while the content of the right of self-determination is lex obscura, there 
are strong indications that the people of Libya and Syria have a continuing right 
of internal self-determination. 
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Talmon ends his analysis with the questionable conclusion that the Syrian 
people do not have a right of self-determination and, consequently, that the 
recognition as the legitimate representative of a people is a mere political act 
without legal implications. As to the question regarding the applicability of 
customary international law to all groups recognised as the legitimate 
representative of a people or only to NLMs in cases related to the decolonisation 
process, Talmon notes that if this rule of customary international law exists, it 
would not automatically apply to cases of internal self-determination.55 However, 
customary international law is not static and can develop. The principle of non-
intervention as a principle of customary international law can be modified. A new 
exception to the general principle can develop through general practice supported 
by the opinio iuris of States.56 The below analysis will scrutinise State practice and 
opinio iuris with respect to providing assistance and arms to the NTC and in 
particular to the SOC. 
In the case of Libya, the UNSC quickly acted and took the lead. Before 
any State recognised the NTC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan 
people, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1970,57 imposing various restrictive 
measures, including an arms embargo, on Libya. On 17 March 2011, the UNSC 
adopted Resolution 1973, imposing a no-fly zone and authorising States ‘to take 
all necessary measures (…) to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under 
threat of attack’.58 On 19 March 2011, the first Western air strikes started.59 There 
is little to analyse State practice and opinio iuris for or against providing assistance 
and arms to the NTC, based on its recognition as the legitimate representative of 
                                               
55 Talmon, ‘Opposition Groups’ (n 5) 236-237. 
56 The ICJ held in the Nicaragua case that ‘[t]he significance for the Court of cases of State 
conduct prima facie inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention lies in the nature 
of the ground offered as justification. Reliance by a State on a novel right or an 
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has not claimed that its intervention, which it justified in this way on the political level, 
was also justified on the legal level, alleging the exercise of a new right of intervention 
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57 UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970. 
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59 ‘Battle for Libya: Key Moments’ Al Jazeera (Doha, 30 April 2017) 
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the Libyan people following the action of the UNSC. The resolutions of the 
Security Council had prohibited arms transfers and had provided a legal basis for 
the use of force even before most States, including the UK, recognised the NTC 
as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. 
In the case of Syria, however, State practice and opinio iuris concerning the 
assistance and supply of arms to the SOC is richer. Many States have provided 
funding and so-called ‘non-lethal’ assistance to the SOC, but only a few have 
supplied the SOC with arms. Next to that, it has been reported that the US started 
to train and arm Syrian rebels through the CIA in 2013. The programme was 
halted in 2017 under the Trump administration.60 Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar 
are also believed to have been arming various groups in Syria.61 
In May 2013, the Council of the EU partly lifted its arms embargo on Syria 
to allow the potential supply of arms to the SOC by Member States. The UK 
pushed for this lift. Although most Member States are believed to have opposed 
the move, the total sanctions regime would have expired without a unanimous 
agreement of all Member States. The Council, thus, agreed on the renewal of the 
sanctions regime, including the export and import restrictions, but with the 
exception of arms.62 ‘With regard to the possible export of arms to Syria, the 
Council took note of the commitment by Member States to proceed in their 
national policies [and that] military equipment (…) will be for the Syrian National 
Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces’.63 Notably, the Council of 
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the EU had not recognised the SOC as the legitimate representative of the Syrian 
people at the time of this decision, but only as legitimate representatives.64 Austria 
opposed the lift of the arms embargo and stated that the supply of arms to the 
Syrian opposition would be a violation of the principle of non-intervention and 
of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.65 In the end, the UK appears to have never 
armed Syrian opposition groups, according to a 2016 report of the UK House of 
Commons Defence Committee. However, the UK has provided training and non-
lethal support to opposition groups.66 
State practice of arming the SOC is limited. What is more, like in previous 
armed conflicts, the State practice of arming politically favoured rebels has 
generally been clandestine and no respective opinio iuris alleging a right to arm the 
rebels has been put forward.67 The US viewed the recognition of the SOC as the 
legitimate representative ‘important politically and it’s also important practically 
in terms of offering opportunities for increased assistance’.68 But the US did not 
view it as a legal step.69 Thus, alleging a right to arm the SOC was not and could 
not have been put forward. 
An analysis of UNGA practice with respect to the SOC, in particular of 
Resolution 67/262,70 is so far absent in academic literature. It would offer valuable 
insights into the Member States’ political and legal understanding of the concept 
of the legitimate representative of a people. On 15 May 2013, the UNGA adopted 
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Resolution 67/262 on ‘[t]he situation in the Syrian Arab Republic’.71 The 
resolution is highly critical of the Assad regime, expressing ‘grave concern’ at the 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.72 The resolution 
further stresses that political transition is ‘the best opportunity’ for a peaceful 
solution of the conflict.73 In paragraph 26 of Resolution 67/262, the UNGA  
 
Welcomes the establishment of the National Coalition for 
Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces on 11 
November 2012 in Doha as effective representative interlocutors 
needed for a political transition (…) and notes the wide 
international acknowledgement, notably at the fourth 
Ministerial Meeting of the Group of Friends of the Syrian 
People, of the Coalition as the legitimate representative of the 
Syrian people (emphasis added). 
 
This paragraph is central to the analysis that follows. The UNGA 
welcomed the establishment of the SOC, but only as representative interlocutors. 
An interlocutor is obviously a weaker form of support than recognition as the 
legitimate representative of a people. While possibly getting ‘a seat at the table’, 
an interlocutor will not be the only one regarded as representing the people. The 
UNGA itself, therefore, did not recognise the SOC as the legitimate 
representative of the Syrian people, but noted its wide international 
acknowledgement as such. The resolution was adopted by 107 votes to 12, with 
59 abstentions.74 Even though the UNGA did not recognise the SOC as the 
legitimate representative of the Syrian people, the explanations of the vote, given 
by Member States in the discussion of the resolution, are nonetheless insightful. 
The Syrian Representative, as one can imagine, strongly opposed the resolution. 
Early in his speech he made the point that the resolution would be 
 
(…) setting a dangerous precedent in international relations 
in its attempt to legitimize the provision of weapons to 
terrorist groups in Syria and to illegally recognize a certain 
                                               
71 ibid. 
72 ibid. 
73 ibid. 
74 UNGA Verbatim Record (15 May 2013) UN Doc A/67/PV.80, 24. 
 
2018 LSE LAW REVIEW 19 
 
faction of the external opposition as “the legitimate 
representative of the Syrian people”75 
 
The Russian Representative, voting against the resolution, stated that the 
resolution 
 
(…) seeks to impose on the United Nations one-sided 
attempts to trample on the tenets of international law in 
order to effect regime change (…). The fact that the so-
called National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Forces is highlighted in the text as the only 
legitimate representative of the Syrian people is an attempt 
to prepare the ground for conferring the authority to 
represent Syria in the international arena76 
 
The Iranian Representative highlighted that the resolution ‘creates a 
dangerous precedent that violates the most elementary principles of international 
law’.77 Nicaragua also warned against setting a precedent which ‘tomorrow could 
be used against any legitimate Government represented here’.78 The 
Representative of Venezuela stated that the resolution 
 
(…) proposes that the United Nations recognize the 
National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Forces as legitimate representatives of the 
Syrian people. That potential recognition, as set out in the 
draft resolution, would (…) entail ignoring a legitimate 
Government and set a terrible precedent for international 
law. (…). The draft resolution seeks to legitimize the rights 
of certain States to provide the Syrian opposition with all 
means necessary, including military means, to overthrow 
                                               
75 ibid 3. 
76 ibid 8. 
77 ibid 13. 
78 ibid 19. 
 
20 The Re-Emergence of the Legitimate Representative of a People Vol. 3 
 
 
the Government. It would thereby endorse the illegal 
supply of arms79 
 
The high number of abstaining States so too shows the scepticism toward 
the resolution. This scepticism is best exemplified by the statements of Uruguay, 
Indonesia, and Argentina. The Uruguayan Representative, for example, was 
concerned that the aspects of the resolutions go ‘beyond the consensus and 
principles applicable to the concept of recognition of Governments’.80 The 
Indonesian Representative, in turn, clarified that ‘implied recognition of who 
constitutes the legitimate representatives of the Syrian people would not be 
consistent with Indonesia’s national practice, which accords recognition only to 
States and not to Governments’.81 The Argentinian Representative abstained as 
‘it is up to the Syrian people, through free and fair elections, and not the General 
Assembly, to determine the democratic legitimacy of its representatives’.82 The 
view that the legitimate representative of the Syrian people cannot be determined 
by the UNGA, but only by the Syrian people, was also taken by the abstaining 
representatives of Brazil and India.83 
Although the language of the resolution does not imply a recognition of 
the SOC as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, multiple States 
voting in favour, including Chile, Guatemala, Thailand, Peru, Mexico, and 
Colombia still clarified that their vote does not confer any recognition. Some of 
the States voting in favour also emphasised that it is not for the UNGA to 
determine the legitimate representative of a people.84 
The resolution represents, nonetheless, an important development. It was 
the first time that the UNGA discussed the concept of the legitimate 
representative of a people outside the cases related to the decolonisation process. 
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Although the number of votes against the adoption of the resolution was relatively 
low, the votes in favour of the resolution were not in an overwhelming majority 
either.85 The amount of States abstaining and the fact that even States voting in 
favour felt the urge to clarify or limit the interpretation of Resolution 67/262 
indicates that many States remained sceptical or at least cautious towards the re-
emergence of the concept of the legitimate representative of a people. 
The statements issued by States during the discussion of Resolution 
67/262 show that there is no opinio iuris among States that arming opposition 
groups recognised as the legitimate representative of a people is legal under public 
international law (outside cases related to the decolonisation process). 
Nonetheless, the statements made by some representatives indicate that this term 
is not perceived as purely political. The opponents of Resolution 67/262 clearly 
feared that a parallel could be drawn between the case of Syria and those cases 
related to the decolonisation context to invoke the rule of customary international 
law which makes assisting and arming the legitimate representative of a people 
lawful. States feared that this resolution might be the first ‘dangerous precedent’86 
of such a development. As the concept has re-emerged outside its traditional 
context, Resolution 67/262 might indeed have been the early beginning of a 
potential new development of customary international law. 
When it comes to Libya and Syria, no new exception to the principle of 
non-intervention, supported by general State practice and opinio iuris, can be 
identified. States did politically justify their intervention in Syria, but did not claim 
that the recognition of a group as the legitimate representative of a people would 
legally justify intervention. The rule to assist and arm the legitimate representative 
of a people developed in a narrower set of cases related to the decolonisation 
process and, as such, does not extend to the NTC or the SOC. 
Resolution 67/262 has so far been the highlight of the re-emergence of 
the concept of the legitimate representative of a people. With respect to Syria and 
the SOC, the term seems to have quietly disappeared in the years that followed. 
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The UNGA never recognised the SOC as the legitimate representative of the 
Syrian people. The hope, which some policymakers might have held in 2012, for 
a quick political transition and the recognition of the SOC as the new Syrian 
government, such as in the case of Libya, soon faded. Russia’s military 
intervention in Syria in support of the Assad regime changed the facts to the 
detriment of the SOC. Most importantly, unity within the SOC was fragile and its 
representativeness of the Syrian people remained questionable.87 Its lack of 
representativeness, for example, became obvious in December 2015 when the 
High Negotiations Committee (‘HNC’) was formed under Saudi Arabian 
leadership, as a new platform to include more opposition groups than the SOC 
had previously encompassed.88 The SOC is, however, a major part of the HNC, 
alongside other groups such as the National Coordination Body.89 The HNC 
represents the Syrian opposition in the Intra-Syrian Peace Process led by UN 
Special Envoy for Syria, de Mistura. That said, not all opposition groups are 
included in the HNC either. For example, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party 
(also known as PYD) was not invited to join.90 
On 18 December 2015, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2254, which 
assigns a role in the political transition to both the ‘representatives of the Syrian 
government and the opposition’.91 On 9 December 2016, more than three years 
after Resolution 67/262, the UNGA again adopted a resolution on ‘[t]he situation 
in the Syrian Arab Republic’.92 In a striking difference to its 2013 predecessor, 
Resolution 71/130 does not mention the term ‘the legitimate representative of 
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the Syrian people’. The resolution only speaks of the ‘representatives of the Syrian 
authorities and the opposition’.93 Notably, ‘the legitimate representative of the 
Syrian people’ was also not mentioned by any State in the debate preceding the 
resolution.94 
Although Western States support the HNC, recognition as the legitimate 
representative of the Syrian people has not been issued. Instead, Western foreign 
policy statements on the situation in Syria refer to the ‘Syrian opposition’,95 a term 
which carries less weight and indicates that the opposition groups only represent 
a part of the Syrian people. In fact, ‘Syrian opposition’ was one of the terms used 
to refer to the Syrian National Council due to its perceived lack of 
representativeness before it formed the SOC with other opposition groups in 
November 2012.96 
While France was the first Western State to recognise the SOC as the 
legitimate representative of the Syrian people in November 2012,97 President 
Macron stated in June 2017 that Assad’s departure is not a ‘pre-condition for 
everything because nobody has shown me a legitimate successor’.98 The growing 
sentiment of Realpolitik among newly elected policymakers in the West that peace 
in Syria might not be possible without Assad99 and the infighting between the 
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opposition groups100 make a recognition of any opposition umbrella platform as 
the legitimate representative of the Syrian people unlikely in the near future. 
The disappearance of the concept of the legitimate representative of a 
people in the case of Syria seems to be rooted in the specific factual circumstances 
surrounding the Syrian opposition. The concept might re-emerge in a near-future 
case, as (regrettably) there is no shortage of intra-State conflicts between 
governments and opposition groups around the world. The cases of Libya and 
Syria are far from establishing a firm precedent, however the re-emergence of the 
concept in these cases is nonetheless noteworthy and might hint at the potential 
beginning of a conceptual development. This is discussed in the next section. 
 
III. BEYOND LIBYA AND SYRIA 
 
Akande is cautious about extending the rule of customary international law, which 
makes the supply of arms to the legitimate representative of a people lawful, to 
cases of self-determination outside the limited context of decolonisation in which 
the rule developed. He warns against the potential abuse if the rule would apply 
to all self-determination cases. The risk of abuse is high because there are no 
defined criteria by which to determine the legitimate representative of a people. 
This would make it possible for States to easily undermine the principle of non-
intervention and the prohibition of the use of force by arbitrarily recognising 
opposition groups as the legitimate representative of a people.101 
Outside the decolonisation context, States have so far not made the case 
for the legality of arming an opposition group based on its recognition as the 
legitimate representative of a people. However, this might have been due to the 
factual circumstances in the case of Syria, rather than due to legal considerations. 
If the foreign ministries of States draft recognition statements ‘with great care and 
the wording employed (or not employed) is of great legal and political 
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significance’,102 why would they choose a term which entailed legal consequences 
in the past if they just want to express political support? For a politician or 
spokesperson of a ministry, ‘the legitimate representative of a people’ does not 
roll off the tongue. So why would civil servants in the foreign ministries suggest 
using this term, if not for underlying (legal) considerations? One could consider 
that the legal teams within the ministries must have been aware that the concept 
originates from the international law of self-determination and must have 
considered the potential legal consequences of the concept. The lack of 
representativeness of, and international support for, the SOC might not have been 
quite convincing enough to make a new legal argument. After all, not even all 
Member States of the EU could find the consensus to recognise the SOC as the 
legitimate representative of the Syrian people. What is more, the SOC was never 
recognised as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people by the UNGA. 
While the UNGA has no monopoly on the recognition of groups as the legitimate 
representative of a people, such recognition would have added substantial weight 
to the legal argument, if it would have been made. Recognition by the UNGA 
would make it easier to draw a parallel to the cases related to the decolonisation 
process. The SOC never managed to acquire UNGA recognition. The fact that 
States have not made the case for the legality of arming an opposition group 
following its recognition as the legitimate representative of a people might be due 
to the anticipated weakness of the argument in the case of Syria. 
The mills of customary international law grind slowly and the international 
custom of providing assistance to NLMs was also not formed overnight. The re-
emergence of the concept of the legitimate representative of a people in cases 
outside the decolonisation context indicates that a conceptual development, 
which has yet to take shape, could occur. In future cases in which the 
representativeness of the respective opposition group is less questionable and the 
facts on the ground are more transparent (than in the case of the SOC), the 
UNGA might be more willing to recognise a group as the legitimate representative 
of a people. The UNGA could also be more willing to assume this role if the 
group or its leader have been legitimised through democratic elections but barred 
from access to power or ousted by a coup d’état. In such a scenario, the people 
themselves would have determined their legitimate representative as demanded 
by many Member States that abstained from voting for Resolution 67/262. The 
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statements made by the abstaining States suggest that they would recognise a 
group as the legitimate representative of a people if the group has been elected in 
a free and fair election. 
Reisman famously pointed at a scenario that highlights a malfunction in 
the collective security system and in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.103 When a 
group succeeds in a coup d’état and exercises effective control over the State 
territory, it may be recognised as government, even if the coup does not represent 
the will of the people. As the government, it can then invite foreign States to 
lawfully intervene to aid in the suppression of popular protests against the coup 
and to maintain effective control. Due to the maintenance of effective control, it 
may remain recognised as the government. In contrast, a foreign State that 
intervenes on behalf of the ousted government or the people in this scenario 
violates international law. This ‘rapes common sense’, according to Reisman.104 
He claimed that ‘[e]ach application of Article 2(4) must enhance opportunities for 
ongoing self-determination’.105 Franck, who argued for an emerging right to 
democratically participate in governance, still strongly opposed unilateral 
intervention in the name of democracy outside the UN framework.106 Neither 
Reisman nor Franck considered the potential role of the concept of the legitimate 
representative of a people in their arguments, as the term had not yet re-emerged 
outside the decolonisation context. It might be that the concept could develop 
and be further shaped in a scenario similar to that described by Reisman. 
There have been exceptional cases in which this malfunction was 
corrected either by the UNSC or by States relying on the doctrine of intervention 
by invitation. In the case of Haiti, the UNSC authorised the use of force. In Sierra 
Leone, the UNSC did not explicitly authorise the use of force and intervening 
States relied on the invitation issued by the ousted president. When it comes to 
the Côte d’Ivoire, the UNSC only authorised a peacekeeping mission for the 
protection of civilians and the events that followed finally resulted in the 
resignation of the sitting president, who had refused to transfer power to the 
winner of the elections.107 In The Gambia, where the sitting president also refused 
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to transfer power upon losing the election, the UNSC did not authorise the use 
of force. The UK and Russia stated that the winner of the presidential elections, 
Barrow, could issue an invitation to intervene on his behalf, even though Barrow 
did not possess effective territorial control.108 The Institut de Droit International 
holds that legitimacy through democratic elections can, as an exception, become 
relevant to offset a lack of territorial effectiveness.109 Even if this notion is 
accepted, it is questionable how long democratic legitimacy could offset a lack of 
territorial effectiveness. A democratically elected group would still need to 
establish effective territorial control to remain recognised as government in the 
long run. If it fails to do so, States cannot lawfully intervene by relying on the 
doctrine of intervention by invitation, as the group would not represent the 
government. The general rule that the group which holds effective control over 
the territory is recognised as the government and can invite a foreign State to 
intervene still holds. If the UNSC does not authorise the use of force, there would 
be no legal basis to intervene in this scenario. 
Cooling relations between powerful permanent members of the UNSC 
and the return of proxy wars might hinder the resolution of future intra-State 
conflicts through the UNSC. If the UNSC is deadlocked in the scenario described 
by Reisman, the UNGA could assume a key role. Democratic legitimacy could be 
a strong argument for the recognition of a group as the legitimate representative 
of a people and could convince a majority of Member States at the UNGA to 
recognise the group as such. States might be more willing to assist an already 
democratically elected group in fighting a coup d’état, rather than assisting a group 
claiming to fight for democracy in a revolution. In this scenario, the UNGA could 
be more assertive than it was with respect to the SOC. The rule which, as an 
exception, allows assisting and arming opposition groups recognised as the 
legitimate representative of a people, might de lege ferenda be modified in the future 
to extend to a narrow set of cases related to democratically elected groups which 
have been barred from access to power or ousted by a coup d’état. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This article has shown that recognition as the legitimate representative of a people 
and recognition as the government are separate issues. The parallel co-existence 
of the two underlines that the test for recognition as the government remains 
effective control. The article has rejected the view that the people of Libya and 
Syria do not have a continuing right of internal self-determination. However, the 
rule of customary international law, which made the assistance and the supply of 
arms to an opposition group recognised as the legitimate representative of a 
people lawful, does not extend to cases outside the decolonisation context. No 
opinio iuris in support of such an exception to the principle of non-intervention 
could be identified with respect to the NTC and the SOC. Nevertheless, UNGA 
Resolution 67/262 is an important milestone in the re-emergence of the concept 
of the legitimate representative of a people, with the UNGA discussing the 
concept outside the context of decolonisation for the first time. 
The article has so too argued that there might be a conceptual 
development in a narrower set of cases in the future. In cases in which 
democratically elected groups have been barred from access to power or ousted 
by coups d’état, the doctrine of intervention by invitation cannot be invoked if the 
elected group does not establish effective control. If the UNSC does not authorise 
the use of force in this scenario, there will be a need for a further conceptual 
development. States could be more willing to make exceptions in allowing the 
assistance and supply of arms to opposition groups, recognised as the legitimate 
representative of a people, in this limited set of cases. As coups d’état and intra-State 
conflicts worldwide are, unfortunately, not rare occurrences, the UNGA might 
again discuss the concept of the legitimate representative of a people in the near 
future. 
 
